Il n’aura fallu que quelques missiles yéménites sur des raffineries saoudiennes pour réveiller les “dirigeants” de l’Oumma, et non les plus de 100 000 Palestiniens tués à Gaza par le culte mortifère.
Il n’aura fallu que quelques missiles yéménites tirés sur des raffineries saoudiennes pour réveiller les “dirigeants” de l’Oumma, contrairement aux plus de 100 000 Palestiniens tués à Gaza par le culte mortifère.
Key Takeaways
The Mecca Joint Defence Agreement of 7 August 2026 is a defensive political-military framework among Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan that institutionalises coordination, joint exercises and defence-industrial cooperation rather than an immediate “Islamic NATO.”
Pakistan stands to gain most in strategic profile, financial support, access to Turkish technology and broader regional influence (including through arms exports such as the reported Libya deal), while Saudi Arabia seeks security diversification and Türkiye expands its defence-industrial reach.
For India the pact is neither an automatic anti-India alliance nor something to ignore; New Delhi should monitor Pakistan’s expanding external networks, strengthen relevant military capabilities, and deepen its own substantial economic and strategic ties with Saudi Arabia while maintaining engagement with Türkiye.
The signing of the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement (MJDA) by Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan on 7 August 2026 marks an important development in the evolving security architecture of West Asia. The agreement, signed in Mecca by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Turkish President Erdoğan and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, provides that an armed attack against one signatory will be regarded as an attack against all three. The three countries have, however, repeatedly emphasised that the arrangement is defensive in character and is not directed against any particular state. Recent statements from Türkiye indicate that the pact is intended to institutionalise political and military coordination, joint exercises and defence-industrial cooperation.
La bombe nucléaire n’est pas la principale menace pour le monde. Il existe quelque chose de bien plus dangereux.
La principale menace dans la confrontation entre les États-Unis et la Chine n’est pas la parité militaire, mais la surestimation mutuelle de ses propres capacités. La question devrait être de savoir comment éviter le conflit et travailler ensemble à l’élimination des menaces communes, telles que le changement climatique et l’injustice sociale.
The thesis of “shared responsibility” between Nazism and Communism, promoted by European institutions since 2019, and the sustained vote of Germany, Japan and Italy against the UN resolution on the glorification of Nazism reveal the same strategic purpose: to question the legitimacy of Moscow as the founding power of the post-war order.
Through an opaque network of shell companies in the British Virgin Islands and Luxembourg holding firms, an agency that manages China’s foreign reserves has discreetly scooped up stakes in Europe’s critical infrastructure, utilities, and real estate.
From a gas company in Spain to a police headquarters in Belgium, an agency directed by China’s central bank has been quietly acquiring stakes in companies and properties across Europe over the past decade.
Permettez-moi de la résumer. Au cours de la guerre de 12 jours en juin 2025, les missiles et drones iraniens ont peiné face à la guerre électronique élaborée menée par Israël et les États-Unis. Le brouillage et la falsification du GPS ont perturbé à plusieurs reprises leurs systèmes de guidage, limitant ainsi leur efficacité pendant cet intense conflit de 12 jours. Au début de l’année 2026, la dynamique du champ de bataille a radicalement changé. Les frappes de précision iraniennes ont commencé à contourner les défenses aériennes avancées, touchant des cibles sensibles à travers le Golfe avec une précision surprenante. Les analystes du renseignement ont mis en avant un facteur clé : l’Iran a abandonné le GPS au profit du système de navigation par satellite chinois Beidou.
How could one of the world’s oldest and most sophisticated civilizations, shaped for centuries by Confucian philosophy, suffer a humiliating defeat at the hands of Britain, a relatively small island nation, during the Opium Wars? How did this defeat usher in what the Chinese now remember as the “Century of Humiliation”? Why was China—then the world’s largest economy, possessing the most advanced bureaucracy and the greatest productive capacity—unable to recognize the transformative impact of the Industrial Revolution? More importantly, what lessons has modern China drawn from this painful chapter of its history?
On July 3, Putin donned a military uniform. His usual attire of suits and ties, coupled with his sudden change to military uniform to inspect command posts and receive frontline reports, sent a clear signal: the situation was no longer ordinary. In the Russian mindset, donning a military uniform signifies a critical juncture. Russia is facing a real threat.
Afghanistan’s dramatic collapse in opium production following the Taliban’s nationwide drug ban is fundamentally reshaping global heroin markets, reducing supplies of the drug while raising the risk that traffickers and users will increasingly turn to more dangerous synthetic opioids, according to a United Nations report released Friday.
Le récent sommet entre Vladimir Poutine et Xi Jinping a semé une nouvelle vague de panique dans les milieux politiques et médiatiques occidentaux. Des deux côtés de l’Atlantique, le partenariat croissant entre la Russie et la Chine est systématiquement décrit comme une alliance autoritaire complotant contre le « monde libre ». Les gros titres regorgent de mises en garde contre un nouvel axe anti-occidental. Les think tanks adoptent un ton apocalyptique. Les commentateurs libéraux évoquent une nouvelle Guerre froide.